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FORGET THE FUNDAMENTALS: FIXING SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS

Kermit Roosevelt III'
INTRODUCTION

In an earlier article,' I argued that both constitutional theory and
analysis of constitutional doctrine could benefit from paying more attention to the distinction between the actual requirements of the
Constitution and the rules that courts have crafted to implement
those requirements. Adopting the terminology that Mitchell Berman
used, I called the former constitutional operative propositions, and
2
the latter constitutional decision rules. Put briefly, the decision rules
perspective asks us to realize that most Supreme Court doctrine consists of tests that the Court has developed (the decision rules), which
it applies to determine whether some other actor has complied with
the actual requirements of the Constitution (the constitutional operative propositions).
The thrust of my argument was twofold. First, I claimed that '''Ie
could get a better sense of the reasonableness of Supreme Court decisions by asking whether there was a good explanation for the choice
of a particular decision rule as a means to implement a particular operative proposition. This analysis would put us in a better position to
3
critique doctrine and suggest modifications. In order to facilitate
the analysis, I offered a list of factors that might suggest the appropriateness of particular kinds of decision rules. Those factors were,
briefly put, the relative ability of courts versus other actors to get the
right answer to a particular question (which I call institutional competence); the costs of different kinds of errors by the courts; the historical record of good faith or constitutional violation on the pan of
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the other actor; the likelihood that the other actor will actually employ whatc\'(>r institutional competence it has; the rdativc feasibility
of judicial enforcement of different decision rules: and the need to
provide guidance for other actors. I
Second, I described a process that has occurred repeatedly in the
course of doctrinal evolution. Initially, the Coun creates decision
rules with an awareness of their nature and frequently explains why it
has chosen a particular rule. As time goes on, however, the awareness
btoes, Eventually, the Court starts to mistake its decision rules for
operative propositions, with prec1ictahle and unfortunate results.-'
The second element of the argument is not really my concern in
this article, though it will make a brief appearance as I try to explain
"vhy our substantive due process jurisprudence appears so vulnerable
to the charge of illegitimacy. The focus of the article is on applying
the ITtethodology 1 described to substantive due process. This requires us first to identify the operative proposition that the Due Process Clause enacts, and then to consider the decision rules that the
Court has adopted.

1.

EARlY SUBSTANTI\T DUE PROCESS FROM THE DECISION RUl.ES
PERSPECTIVE

'What is the constitutional operative prOpOSltlOn underlying the
Due Process Clause? The very idea of substantive due process has
been derided as oxymoronic, most famously by John Hart Ely, who
likened it to "green pastel redness."" But there is an obvious sense in
which the clause does have a substantive content. It forbids deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It thus
requires that the government act by means of valid la\vs.'
This is substance, but of a minimal sort. It converts the idea of
substantive due process from oxymoron to pleonasm: of course the
government must act by means of valid law. The Due Process Clause,
on this reading, might seem to do very little. It establishes the requirement that deprivations of life, liberty, or property must be accomplished by lawful means, but it does not itself establish boundaries to the set of lawful means. It might thus seem to protect
individuals only from laws that are invalid for some independent reason.

I

It!, ai 16:~)8-67,

'. SI'I' it!, al 169;) ("These consequences illcludt> ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts to bind
nonjudicial aClors to decision rules ralher than operalive propositions, and an undoing of lhe

benefits of decision rules,"),
~ JOliN HART ELY, DD-IOC~-\CYN"O DlSTRL'ST I ~ ( IYHO),
S{'/, L\LRE;\;CF 1-1. TRill!::, I ..-\j\lLRICA'\ CO'\STrJ l' 1'10'\-\[, L\\\' 1332-33 (3d eel. 2UOO) (stating
lhal "by lO(,iS, a n:cognized meaning of the qualih'i ng phrase 'of la\\" IVas substa!1li\'e"),
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In fact, I think this is a good description of the early substantive
x
due process caselaw. v\11at the due process jurisprudence of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century sought to do was to keep the
government within its bounded powers-to bar it from acts that exceeded its authority and were therefore in a real sense, lawless.'! The
bounds of governmental power were derived not from the Due Process Clause, but from more basic principles, starting with the idea that
the government is the agent of the people and wields only those
powers they have seen fit to give it.
Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v, Bu.ll puts the point neatly,
"The purposes for which men enter into society[,]" Chase wrote, '\vill
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they
are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are
the proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power
wi]] limit the exercise of it.,,11l Thus, Chase's analysis did not rely on

Ir is ar odds with the crude political analysis of I.ochnerian jurisprudence, "'hich sees sllbstanti\e clut' process as motivatecl by a devotioll to the illtt'H'sts of capital-or, slighth' 1cs:'
crlldt'h. to laissez-faire economics. See gennall), EI)\'L\RO S. CORWI~, COL:RT On:R CO\:STITL'TI< l:,
(l~l3H). h is also contrary to the conventional view that takes I,ur/weno stalld for a 111lldal1lenial
right to liberty uf CUll tract and an antecedent of modern fundamental rights in sllbstantj\t' dllt'
process decisions, such as Hoe v. VFadl', SI?(', e.g., ROBERT H. BORE., THE TE~IPTI\:(; OF :\ ,IERIC·\ 32
(l<)~)()) ("Who says Hoe must say Lochller . .. "). It accords quite well with \\'hat has becn ctlled
I_or/II/I'!' re\lsionism-broadly speaking, the school that sees tIlt' Lorhl1el c era .lllrispruclence as ~\
good-failh ~\ttelllrt to enforce limits on the police pu\\'er. . 'ot;ible colJtributions 10 Ihis \'ie\"
include B\RRY CUSIIMAN, RETHINI-J"'t; THE ;\FW DEAL COUU: TI IE STRU:TURE OF A
(:U\:STITLTIO'\.-\L Rn'OLl'TION (1998); HOW.\Rll GIL1.\I.\'\, TI IE CO\:STITUTIO\: BESIECED: TilE
RISE\"iD DDIISE OF LOCII:"ER ERA POLICE PO\n:RsjU<ISI'RL'DEl'CE (199~); C. EO\l':\RO WHIIL,
TilL CU\:STln;no,\ A:\O THE NEW DFAL (\:'000). Revisionism has succeeded well euough thai it
might b,~ cal1ee! a revolution, and indeed ir has inspired countene\'olutiollaries, uOlalJly Da\'id
Bertlslein. SI't' David Bernstein, Lochner F;1'O Rr"isionis Ill, Revi~ed: Lochner al/rltlll' Ori,!{iIl5 0IFIlIId(1/1l ('II til I Right5 COllstitutionali51ll, 92 CEO. L..J. J, 6-7 (~OO~) (describing tlw increasing amounls
of rect'nl "re\'isionist historical scholarship about l.. urhl/l'l'iall jurispnldcnce," which inspired
·'counler-re\·isionist lilerature,").
:lllg/:'I'1'!' v. Louisiana, HiS U.S. 578 (lH97), a case freqncntJv cited for the creation of the
··fundamental right to contract," is a perfect illustration. \~'hat was at issue in AIIgl'JI'r was LOIIisiana's ~Ilternpt to regulale a contract eutered into in ;-..Jew York. This la,,' was c1et'l1wd un con.';litlliional not for anv reason rclau:d to libeny of conlract, but because ir was an allcmpt to pr<>ject regulatory power beyond the borders of Louisiana, somelhing the dominanl territori;tlisl
\ie\,,' of stale legisLui\c jurisdiction held impermissible. S('f' id. at 588 (nOling thai "[he contraCt
\,,'as made ill "it-w York, outside of the Jurisdiction of L.ouisiana .... "); irl. ,1I 591 (noling thaI ;1
slare's "po\\'cr does nOI and cannot extendlO prohibiting a citizen from making contracts of lilt'
n<llure imolyecl in this case outside of the limits andjurisdietioll of the Slare, ;Ind which arc' ;tlSIJ
to be perfurmed outside ofsuchjurisdiClion ... ,.'). The law \\'as beyolHll.he geogr;lphic scope
of Ihe IcgisLllure's authority, and therefore Ihe clilempi to enforce it was forbidden by tilt' Dul'
Process CLlllse. This is not at all the recognition of a fundamental right 10 (o1l\raC1; I10tllillg ill
the COllll', analysis suggested thal ;\ew York could not h;\\'e imposed the n>gulalioll tll;ll 1,./1
out.'iidl' Ihe powers of Louisiana.

n

,,, :1l'.S
Dall.) :-1::-16, :1;-.;:-\ 1.179H) (emphasis rell1(l\'ed). S('('fll.loFietcher\. I'nk. IU l,.S. x7.
J:Vl (INIIJ) (··ll JJl;IY \\'ell \w doubled \dlelher l.he nalure ofsociel\ and ofg()\'(~rnm(,Jn dol"' 111'1
presuih,' "1Ill(' lilliits to the legislativl' power
J.

;n[ 'it\'\I,

llK(i

(JF L().\".\FIn 'FIr ;,\,\1. /,,1 \ \'

affirmative rights, but rather absences of power. There were some
things, he re<lsoned, that the people forming a gmernment would
simply not \-vant that government to do, and they would !10l delegate
it the necessary power. "It is against all reason andjustice," he \\Tote,
"for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCJ-l powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done iL""
This Limit to governmental power was the constitutional oper;Hive
proposition that the LodUlfl~era courts sought to enforce. Like all
courts, they confronted the question of what decision rules should be
employed to determine whether the legislature had exceeded the
scope of its authority. As is characteristic of courts in the early stage
of jurisprudential evolution, they attempted, essentially, to enforce
the operative proposition directl)'.'~ .r\.s Stephen Siegel has put it,
Lochner~era constitutional aqjudicatiotl was marked by constitutional
conceptualism: the belief "that courts could and should use f~\irly ahstract concepts, defll1itions, and principles to resolve legal disputes[,]" and that these concepts "must be contained in the Constitution, or must so clearly effectuate goals contained in the Constitution
that for all intents dnd purposes they may be conceived of as heing
contained in the Constitution."I\
v\That sorts of acts might fall outside the scope of delegated power?
Justice Chase gives examples: to punish citizens for innocent acts, to
make a man ajudge in his own case, to take property from A and give
14
it to B. This last theme recurs in the substantive due process jurisprudence, where it gradually transmutes into the idea that governmental action must serve a public purpose, or promote the public interest, rather than benefiting (or burdening) a discrete segmen t of

" C(lldn, 3 L,S,

C) Dal!.) at

See aLso .lOSEI'll STOR\'. CO\I\IE"T\RIES 0" Till
4!0-11 (1891) (discussing the inherel1l. limits of legisb-

:,8K,
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I.ive power).
I" For a description of the ckU,tC1Crisl.ic evolution of decision rules. sec Roosevelt. ,lulHiI
note I. at 11558-67,

:'\ Stephen A. Siegel. Loch l1er /:;ro Jurisprudpf/,e (/nd the A lIlerican CO/lstitutiollf/I Fmdiliol1, 70
Ne. 1.. RF\'. I, ~3-~4 (191) I ).
" Caliln, 3 U,S. at 388, Chase here is doing general constitutional lal", which could also be
called natural law or political philosophy, See gl'/ln([lty ;\!ichael G. Collins. ne!on' LocllnerUivrrsity./urisdicliol1 alld /hl' f)pueLuIJlI/I'll/ o/(,PIll'ml COllstilu/iollaL I.all', 74 Tn .. 1.. Rl\. 1~()" (~()()())
General conslitlitional Ll\\' was part of the gcneral coml1lon law. Read illto state constitutions by
federal couns e~crcising diversity jt(risclinion (and therefore allthorized to decide non federal
questions), it was superior to ordinary state law. and state courts were not aut.horit.atil'e as t.o its
meaning. However, it was not federal in nature, and stat.e \a1"S in conflin with general constitutional I,ll\' could not be challf'nged as I'iolations of federal rights, The Due Process Clause of
t.he Fourteenth Amendment \\'dS nndcrstood to federalize the gcneral constitutional \;[\\', making it a resource courts could use to strike down state laws in the e~ercise of federal question
jurisdiction. Spe id, at 129li, See alyo l\.nlllit Roosevelt Ill, Ligh/ From [)md Sian: The PwcpdumL
Adi'qua/e and hldellel/dellt .'·ita/e (;mullil !?p(()lIlideIPd, 103 COLU.\1. 1.. Rn', IK88. It'96-97 (2003)
(describing role of general cOllstitur.ionallalV in diversity anions),
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the population. ' Other bounds on permissible legislation were discerned through conceptual analysis of the police power-the general
governmental authority to act in order to promote the public health,
lll
safety, and morals.
Also active was a theory that took literally the
idea that the government ,vielded delegated private power. If this is
so, then one might look to the rights that people could assert against
each other at common law to gain a sense of the powers that they
could give to the government. Thus, for instance, the government's
power to abate a nuisance was generally considered to be the aggregated power of private citizens and subject to the same constraints.
Likewise, the permissibility of governmental attempts to redress inequalities in the bargaining process was limited to those situations in
which the common lav" of contracts perceived an inequality. I, (Police
pm-vel' regulations, which might incidentally impinge on contractual
freedom, ,,,'oldd not be subject to this restraint.) These are decision
rules, but they are decision rules that stay quite close to the operative
proposition.
\iVhy did tbe courts think that attempting to track the operative
propositions was a good idea? In large part, the ans""er comes from a
consideration of the factors mentioned in the introduction-most
notably, institutional competence. Constitutional adjudication in the
late nineteenth and earl" twentieth centuries was seen essentially as
categorization. I" Activitie:s were classified as public or private and ~ub-

,', SI'P jOHr\ V.

ORTII, DUE PROCESS OF LA\\": A BRIEF

HISTORY:'> I-/:) (2(J():1)

(c~ploring "froll1

A 10 B" .iurispnldellct' and its evolution into a protector of thl' public illl<:,]"(·st). SN' also. P.g.,
Van/.<UH \. v\'adde1. J{) Tenn. ~[i{), at ':'GO (l8~9) ('"A law which is partial in its operation, intended IU affeel particular indi\'iduals alone, or to deprive thelll of th,' lwndil of the general
laws, i) unwarral1tt'<l b\' thl' cOllstitution, and is void."").
A~ inf-luelllial COllllllclll.<"llOr Christopher Tiedeman put il. "[L]his police pO"!.T oj Iht,
LO the proLcction uf the lives, limbs. health, comfort and quict of all persons, and
the protection of all propert\' within the Stale." CiIRISTOI'I-IER C. TIEIlL\IAi\:, ,\ TRE.\TISr. 0:'\ Till"
1.1\1IT.\Tl():'\~ OF TilE POLICE PO\\ER Ir\ TilE U:"!ITD ST.-\TES 4 (JHHl1) (citing Thorpe \'. RIIILmcl
R.R., 2, Vt. ] 4t), J :-,0 (18:);))). A somewhaL broadn \'ie\, is sugg("ste<l b\' M Will i'. ///iIiOis, (J..j l' .S.
I U. l~:'> (1t\7(j) (describing police powers as lls{~d b)' lhe gU\enlllWnl to "rcguLuelJ 11w (011due: of its citizens one Ill\\'ards another, and the manner in wlti,'h ",lch ~hall ll~l" Itis 0"'11 property, \l'h"ll such rcglliation becunws necessary f()r tlte public good."). fot a discussion of ditJt-rl'IH cOllcepts oj i11l.' police pOl",'r, sec C]enn H. Re\'nolds &: ]);llid I~. Kop('1. Fill' J:";'o!l,illp: elililF
/>",,,,,r: SIJIIiP ObWI1/fllillll.llllf ([ ;\'1'71' (;l'Illllry, 27 H,\STt:'\CS CO:'\ST. L.Q. :-)J 1 (2()t)t)) (COlltrasling till'
lie IIII'/O 'IIH.I \(/111.1 jJvjJllli \'lTsions of police power)
Ih

SiaL<-' c~tcnds

S"I' Roscoc POllnd, i.iberl.' vI" (;olllmlf, 18 )'.\1.1'. L..J. ·IS4. 4(;, (I 'J()K) (d('scribing jlldges as
,·\"t1u'lIing statutes "b, i1w mC,lsun: of COlll11l011 1,1\\' doctrines railwr than h\' IIt 1· C'"1"litlllion""\.
OJ courst' tltis ]OUKS ,"ntitel\' incoherent it the common law itself i.s ,I cn<t1ion of thc gU\"lTnIllClll: hml"l'\"{:'r, .judges of the 1.111"1/111'1" (Ta did not IhinK it \l'as ...\n<l illl' disc(J\"(T\' Lku COllllllon
1<"1\\' is. in fact. SI,lte \;1,,·-a re\"l:blion G1nonic;tll\' 'lssociat(·d "'iill Fri/~is part of the n'aSOll th;lI
illis lim' becuJI1'"s illlpossihle to llI<lintam.
J

SI'>' ,e,,'lIf'ml/r \\"11.1.1.\\1 \1. \\IEU:I" Til r. LOST "'(WID ()F <:1. \...,,,/1:\1 LI-.i ;.\1 TII{ )(,Ill' I. \ \\
\:'\1) lllF.UI()(;\I:'\\\lll{)(:-\, I~kl;-I":), ilq(J~).
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ject to varying degrees of regulation on that basis.I'I Regulations were
classified as falling within the police po\\'t':r, hence valid, or exceeding
it, and hence invalid. Or the question mighL be whether the law
senTcl a public purpose (permissible) or a private one (impermissible) ;~" or whether it \-vas general (permissible) or partial (suspect) ."1
And categorization, as the essence of acqudication, was seen as a task
within the judicial competence. Courts did not, as Lochner itself insisted, sit to judge the wisdom or expediency of legislation.:!:! They
simply marked out the boundaries of state power. \JVithin those
boundaries the state could do essentially as it wished.
II. THE SHORT DEATH OF SUBSTA\:TIVE DUE PROCESS

The [j)chner jurisprudence did not, of course, persist. Many explanations have been given for its demise. The one I offer here is
consistent with some, notably the revisionist account. It shifts focus
somewhat, however, in that it operates in terms of the factors driving
the creation of decision rules. vVhat happened to the Lochnerjurisprudence, generally speaking, was that the distinctions it sought to
maintain came to seem either incoherent or within the competence
of the legislature to discern. The process was driven hy a number of
distinct, hut related, developments.
One was primarily factual. The economic turmoil of the ] 930s
challengee! the idea that redistributive legislation was never in the
public interest and therefore could be placed categorically outside
the bounds of legislative power. A general economic collapse was
clearly not in the public interest, and to the extent that redistribution
was needed Lo maintain the viability of the larger economic system, it
becarne impossible for the Court to assert that the people would
never have entrusted the legislature with such power. Thus, the decision rules the Court had adopted came to seem implausible as a
means or implementing the underlying reCjuirement that legislation

I"
Sfl'. ('.g., ,\lUI/I/, 94 U.S. at 1~6 ("Property does become clothed w'ith a public interest "'hen
used in a In<lnl1(T to make it of public consequence, and affect the community <It large"').
"" Sl'e l.oan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 \'\'all.) 655,661 (1871) (holding that a tax is void if it
is exercised onh' (() aid a private enterprise-i.e. not for public use).
"I
SFe, e.g.. C. [ch,'ard v\'hite, RroisitingSubsllllllive Vue }J ruress alld HO{lIles\ Lochner Vissl'lll, 63
BROOK. L RF.\. 'd7, 88 (1997) (U [1'] he principle [was] that no legislature could enact 'parrial'
legislation, legislation that imposed burdens or conferred benefits on one class of citizens
ratlwr than Ihe citizenry as a whole.").

"" Sl'f l.ochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,56-57 (l905) ("This is not a question ofsubstitJiling
the .judgment of the court for that of the legisbture. If the act be within the pO\,'er of the State
it is valic!, alt llutlgh the judgment of the court might be totally opposed to the enactment of
such a !<l\\..... ).

FORGHT THE FUNDAMEN7:4.LS

Sept. 2006]

be in the public interest.~:\ In a series of cases, the Court abandoned
its categorical prohibitions in favor of more fact-dependent balancing
tests.
Some degree of g'overnmental interference with the workings of
the market had always been permitted: even price controls were al1m-ved for businesses that were "affected with a public interest." The
origin of this particular categorical distinction is somewhat obscure.
AlLhough in iV1unn, the Court attempted to offer a functional definition that turns on state-granted privileges or obvious market failures,
the phrase "affected with a public interest" came from a seventeenth
21
century treatise on seaports by Sir .1atthew Hale. And in 1 q~4, Nebbia v. New York admitted that the set of businesses affected with a public interest was "not a closed category" and indeed that the category
itself had no analytic content, being simply shorthand for the conclusion that such businesses were "subject to control for the public
good."~·'

As it did in other doctrinal areas (notably the Commerce
Clause) ,~t; the shift from categorization to balancing located the decisive question \vithin the legislative competence. "In subjecting the
price-structure of an industry to control," ''',Talton Hamilton V\Tote,
"the division of labor between the legislature and the court seems
clearly marked. The discretion must belong to the law-making body,
a restrained power of revicv\; to the judiciary."~7 The reason Hamil ton
gave is one purely of institutional competence: "To the primary! question of the necessity for regulation the courts cannot easily give a
right answer. ... The questions which focus about need, a scheme of
control, and expected performance are ve!}! intricate and highly
tech nical. ,,~.~

or

l·'. As Ilamiltoll put it, "the ecnnomic order is rapidly changing; ,IS our k!1()\vi<'dge
it!] . , . gro\\'s, our cnnceptioJ1s of how it \\'orks are subjen 10 amendme!1t or rcplaccIlwllt.
:\ !1l'\\"l'r and more realistic conception of competition suggests, not a 11e\\ end for pllblic polic\',
Illil another means I()r reaching a recogllized encl." Walton H. HamillOll, Alfnl({lio'/l l'lilh fJI/Mi,.
JI/II'II'\I, :\<) Y\LF: LJ 1089, I J ()8-0~) (I ~r)())

':; Jd, ,11 J OS'!. \\"11\ this concept scenwd appropri;\tc to the rcglllation of a t\\""lltieIl1 U'IHU1,
,'COllOIll\, is nOI ob,'ious. and one explan;uioll of iLS introductiO]1 is th;ll Ihe COlin ,,';is simph
lookillg for a It'SI that fell \\'itltin jlldicial competence and thus allm\'ed for ]1on-def('l"cnliaJ ('11,
rOr('("IlWIII. Likewise, a fOCllS on fonll;t! t'qualitY of conlr,IClual capacilv rather Ihan ,SllbSLlIui\'t'
cqllality of bargaining po\\'er allowt'd lilies !o be dr;l\\'l1 O!1 a legal, Luht'r tlt,ln a LICI11,t1 basis.
('II.suring tku the doclrinal leS! rt'nLli1wd \\'ithill the re;t!m of'.Iudicial t'xpcnist" As POlllld pill
it. COllllS ,Idopll'd ,1 ntl(~ llnder which "1111' kgislalllrt' call not I<Ik(> Ilotiu' of the dr/Ill III subjllgalioll orolle cbss of persons 10 another illlliaking COlllr;IClS ofeillployml'ni ill ccn;lill illdusll'ies,
hili illll'>l be gownwd b,' Ihl' t1]('orctic;t!, jur;1I t'qu;tlil\'," Pound.llIpm nOll' 17, al ,,!if),
c ~'II l,S :,0:2. ,-,:16 (I (n~),
'!,. Sf'f' R,)()s('\,ell. \/I/1I'1l nOll' I, ;1I ](;7:-;-/() (descrihillg Ihe n'Lliiollsltip I>l'1'''('('11 luLJIICillg
;111d ddtTt'll<T in COlllllll'rCl' Clause clses),

I Lillliliol1.
'c>

fd,

III/JlO IIOi(' ~'\.

a1' 1/11,

(I ~ )( I
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The categorictl nature of limits on the police pOvver eroded in ~l
similar wave The ability of the state to legislate for the protection of
the health of its citizens had always required the J'ucliciarv to assess
the reality of the alleged threat and the eflicacy of the legislative solution. As long as this could be done via more or less ahstract reasoning, it could be portrayed as a question within the judicial competence.
Thus the Lorimer lllcuority, confronting the question of
whether the trade of haking \-vas unhealthy, commented from its armchair that" [t] 0 the common understandi~~,the t~ade of a bak:r has
never been regarded as an unhealthy one. - Justtce Harlan, dissenting, brought a medical treatise to hear.:\() The famous Brandeis briefs
employed heavier weapons: moun tains of empirical and statistical
evidence in support of the legislative conclusion.:\1 Armchair reasoning could not stand against this assault; indeed, once the question was
understood as one that turned on hard facts, it shifted decisively into
the sphere of legislative competence. The Court seemed to be second-guessing the wisdom of the legislative decision, and secondguessing a decision within the legislative competence.
On a more theoretical level, the realization that the common law
was in fact state law suggested that identifying partial state interventions in the market was simply impossible. The common law regime
is just as much a product of state action as the common law plus
minimum wage regime, If each set of entitlements is a product of
state action, the idea that one and not the other can be deemed unconstitutional state favoritism is incoherent. Either regime can be
viewed as providing a subsidy, one to workers and one to employers,:\~
and that, of course, is Rrecisely what the Court recognized in ~Vest
1
Coast Hotel Co, v. Parrish.j

•

j

"'0 Lochner \'. New York, 198 U.S. 4:), ;')9 (1905). This follows a r~lther oflhand reference lO
"looking through st~\listics regarding all trades and occupations.'" Id. As POlll1d put it, courts
assumed that "questions which aualytically are pure questions or ber, when they become questions for the coun LO decide, must be looked at in a different ""ay from ordinary questions of
fact and must he dealt with in an academic and artificial mallnel' because they have become
questions of la\\'." Pound, sujJra note 17, at 468.
", I,oehner, 198 C.S. at 70 (l-Iarlan,J, dissenting) (quoting a Illcdical treatise about the diffiCltlt working cOllditions of bakers).
Ii See, eg., N ..\)i(Y'AOLOCH, /HUUJ:R V. OUF(;ON: A BRIEF HISTORY \\"ITII DOCU\IE"TS 1 09-,'>3
(1996) (excerpting Brandeis's brief, which included a lengthy sectiun on the "dangers of long
hours") .
:\" Assuming, of coursf', that minimum wage laws have the desired effect.
:n :'00 Lr.s. :'79, 399 (19:'7) (recognizing that states can choose to pass minimum wage laws
and are not reqnirecl to subsidize "unconscionable employers" hI' allowing low wages). See also
C1SS SUllsteill, Lochner"s Legrl(y, 87 COLCY!. L REV, 87:', 876 (l ~IR7) (discussing Wl'sl Coasl Hold
and the Court's radically changed view about the appropriatelless of subsidies). Miller v.
Schon/e, 27(i U.s. '272 (1928), is another case of similar vintage ",hich reflects the recognition
that departing fmm the common law baseline is not different in kille! from adhering to it. Ac-

FORcEr nne' FUl\Tj)AlvU~N'l'A.LS

Sept. 20()6]

991

'Vithout the set of common lavl' entitlements as a neutral baseline
by which to measure governmental intervention, the idea of the public interest as something courts could identify and protect becomes
much ha.rder to make out. ,,,7ith no constraint on redistribution, any
law that provides net social benefits is arguably in the public interest.
But if the test is simply \vhether the benefits of a law exceed its costs,
it falls within legislative competence, and judicial enforcement looks
like usurpation of the legislature's policymaking role.
vVith these new understandings ascendant, LorhneF-erajudicial revie\-\' came to seem not simply misguided, but also illegitimate. '''Then
the categorical lines the Court had sought to maintain broke down,
retrospective assessments suggested that it had simply been substituting its policy preferences for those of the legislature-a venture unjustified in terms of institutional competence, and unjustifiable in
terms of democratic self-governance. The post-Lodme1- Court renounced all claims to judicial superiority in the definition of the public interest; as Bemwn v. Pmher put it, "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms \vell-nigh
conclusive. ,,:\4
Deference to legislative assessment of the public: interest made the
police power essentially un bounded. Because almost any law could
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, almost any law
would fall within the police power-I" IJochne1~era police pmver jurisprudence was dead as a meaningful constraint. I',
\Nhat, then, remainecl for substantive due process? The kernel
from which the specific prohibitions had grown was the idea that the
government must act in the public interest, or to promote the gen-

cording \() the COllrt. "~I i! I I\ollld IL\I(' been none ill(' less a choin·" !I ,HI i1lt'
III illlCly(>ne and change llw b,\scliIH" or pi-open\' lal\', JrI, at 2i t ).

st~lI("

(!t-cided 110,

" :1"j8 L ,S 2G, 3~ (1 'F>l),
Imponanth', hll\"t,\,(~r. ill(> rt'!;lxalion of consrraints occurred in \t'l'll1S of decision nI1t's,
no[ 0pt'laril'(~ proposilions, That is_ in upholding lall's that looked lib" naked fa\'oritism, slich as
the s\allIl<"S challcngnl ill \\'illimll.\ol/ ,', 1.1'" OjJtiml alld Railiua), t-:xjJlP\\ .'1,1':1'111:)' ,', Xl'lJI l'ork. the
COllrt did not S~ty ih~1l i1lt' Constitution allo\l'(>d naked fa\'oritislll. lnsle;tC1. il siretched to exIrt'nw lengths to lind <I pllblic-regarding t'xplan~liion for llw lal\'S--il ;Ipplin! an cXlrt'IllI'h c1derellti~d decisiull I'll'" tl> "ld'lrce Ihe '<In](> operari\'l" proposition ~I" tht' J.{Ji'/UIN CIJllrt, \1'i',1',g..
Willia/l1so!1 v, Lee OptIC;!, :),~,q L',S, -un (l'Fi:)) (ilpholding a S[;.IllIle lh~!t b\'ort'd oplllha!mo!ogists and 0jlIIJ/l1ctrisls): I~.I', Express ..\gl'IIC\', Inc. I, ~,>\\'\'ork, ",:1(i l:,S, 1(1) (]'j ..E)) (1Ip!tolding a
stallile tilal !';\\'ored I'l'ilirks displaying advenisclllclliS Orpnl(\llCiS sold hI' ()\I'IlI'r),
'I',

,,, One lI'al of sLilillg Ilw conseql\(',HT is ih;.:t since il bccallw illlj)Os,.,ill\(' to arglll' dl;1I ;1 gOl(·I1IIlH'nl;t! ;ICl f(-ll {)lll,.,idt' the police pIJII'er. CUlinS 1\,('1'" f,')rced in i<'!<-Iltih illc!i,idll;,i rig-ill.s Ill;l!
could dc!l';<.t lalid c'>;I'lcisl'S of -'laIC jJoII'cr-rigllls ;!S II'IIIllpS, ill J)1I'(,rkill's phr;!SI', I lI'ill ;lrgllt'
ill;11 Illld''1''~1I1dillg SI!llSI;llllil'I' dill" pron'ss in \<.T1l1S oj' j'lllldallll'IIt;1! righh is /l1i'laK,'n, S,'(' InJm
ll':\:t ;In'oJnp;lI:\illg IJOlt'."

{}--t-"l.
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eral \\'clbre." Even this nucleus had eroded. Once it had suggested
that legislation must distribute its benefits widely-serve the interest..;;
of the broad public, rather than a narrow group. That requirement
\\as gone. A conception of the legislative process as interest-group
plu!,d ism suggested that legislation that benefited one segment of society at the expense of another might still promote the public interest
in the long run. A.s long as the benefits of each law exceeded its burdens, shifting coalitions would guarantee that in the end each interest group \-vould get its turn in the sun.\~ vVhat remained, then, was
only the idea that the benefits of a law should exceed its burdens. If
that condition was satisfied, concerns about distribution were irrelevant. In the fullness of time, everyone would be better off
At least, everyone who had a chance to participate in the give and
take of interest group bargaining on equal terms would be better off
Some groups might not; some groups might be the targets of a legislature that sought to harm them without tangible benefits to anyone
else. Or they might find themselves unable to form coalitions, with
the result that even a succession of welfare-enhancing la",,'s would
leave them worse off, as their interests were repeatedly sacrificed to
benefit others. These are the groups that Carolene Products swore to
defend.'" The Carolene Court recanted the decision rules that had
proven unworkable or unwise; but at the same time, like Galileo before the Inquisition, it reaffirmecl its commitment to the operative
proposition. Footnote four-and the political process theory that
John Hart Ely drew from it-can be understood as the attempt to
craft new decision rules to enforce the original proposition that legislation should produce net benefits to society. That proposition is the
heart of substantive due process, and it can be derived both easily and

" .')vrC;I1.L\I,·\\:, supra note 8 (arguing that a guiding principle in I.;ochnn~era decisiuns \vas to
promou: general welfare bv striking dmvn legislatioll that was deernedlO advance special illtereS1S of particular groups or classes).

\iol coincidentallv, interest group pluralism became more popular in political scienu" at
lime. Spe, E'.g., Alfred L Brophy, Race. Class. and the IVgulation oj the Legal Professioll ill
Ihp /'mgn·.uivE' Lm.: Thp Casp of thr. 1908 CanaliS, l~ CORNELLJL & PL'B. POL'y 507, 62~ 11.6:>
(20():» (noting the "fundamental transformations ill Arnericanjurisprudence alld legal practice
that occurred during the first several decades of the twentieth century", including "the replacement of notions of a consensual 'public interest' with ideas of interest group pluralism")
(quoting Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan 10 Button: Legal Ethics and the N/vICP (Part //), 8 L.
CHI. L SOl, ROU:\DTABLE ~81, 282 (~0()2»; Reuc! L Schiller, t;nlmging the Admini,\lrrtliliE' Polity:
.\rllllinillmtivl' l~{[lI' and till' Chan,g;ing De/inition of Plnmlislll, /945-1970, 53 V:\ND. L RE\·. n8~),
I :)~)~)-I-tO() (2000) (describing the enthusiasm social sciemists had for interest group pluralislll
dllring the J940s). Schiller quotes John Chamberlain, writing in 1940, cheerfully describing
interest gruups as "the corporate age's analogue to the individual freeholder of Jeffersonian
tillles." Id. at 1399 (quotingJOHl . CHAMBERL\I:\. THE A~tERJCAI'\ ST,\KES ~8 (1940»).
:'.s

tile

5:1111('

'." ')O-~ L'.S. 144,1:'>2 n.4 (1938) (suggesting heightened scrutiny as a ('esponse to "prejllClice
ag,lillsl discrete and insular minorities ... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of thuse
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities").
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directly from Chase's account. One thing the people plausibly would
not want the government to do is to enact laws that do not make society better off.
One of the odd twists of our constitutional history, of course, is
that it fell to the Equal Protection Cla'use to fulfill the promise of
footnote four. This is a mistake and, I will argue, a serious one; it has
produced deformations in our jurisprudence comparable (and, I will
suggest, related to) those that stem from the use of the Due Process
Clause to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. Substantive
due process, after a brief period of dormancy, returned in a different
form. In the modern era, its most salient and most controversial
function is to protect unenumerated "fundamental" rights from governmental interference.
This modern jurisprudence has been criticized frequently and vociferously. I \,,,ill consider two main bases for the criticism, with the
aim of showing that the modern approach is at least partly defensible.
The first criticism is that the text of the Due Process Clause says nothing about fundamental rights. The second is that even if the clause
should he interpreted as protecting certain fundamental rights,
judges have no greater ability than legislatures or ordinary citizens to
identifY unenumerated rights as fundamental. These criticisms correspond to the two main perceived failings of Lo(hner-era due process:
that the Court took on a task for which it had neither authority nor
competence.
The firs! criticism is well-founded as slated. The Due Process
Clause certainly does not make any obvious reference to fundamental
rights, and the early due process jurisprudence was less concerned
with deciding the fundamentality of an asserted rigbt than \vith setting boundaries to the police power. One might \vell \,vonder how the
notion of constitutionaily special "fundamental rights" entered due
process jurisprudence, and \vhether \,ve migh t be better off without it.
But leaving those questions aside for the moment, accepting this
criticism does not mean that modern substantive due process decisicms are entirely unjustified.
Fundamental rights may not be hiding in the Due Proccss Clause,
but. the idea that governmental acts must be in the public interest is

there, and heightened scrutiny of laws infringing on important interests is a plausible decision rule to adopt as a means of implementing
this proposition, The justification for such a decision rule relates to
the costs of error and the likelihood of unconstitutional action, If a
g-<)\'crnmenlcl! act imposes especially high costs Oll the individuals it
affects, it is less likely, ail other things being equal, lO produce a net
benefit to SOcil'lv-lc'ss likely, that is, to comply with the undf'rlying
o!)cralivc !)\'()l)()sition. Moreover, erroneollslv ;,tllowil1g
such a law to
<sland mal be all error with higher than normal costs-higher costs
j

.'
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than upholding a law with no legitimate henefits but rninimal burdens, for example.
v\'hat about the argument that judges have no greater ability than
legislatures or ordinary citizens to identify fundamemal rights, or illterests \vhose infringement imposes especially high burdens on inclividuals? The cost-of-error justification may do some work here as
well. Even if the courts are no better at iclen tifying rights or balancing interests, the availability of judicial review as a second screening
device will weed out some unconstitutional laws that would othenvise
be enforced. vVhether that benefit is enough to justify an antideferential decision rule depends on our assessment of the relative
costs of striking constitutional laws and allowing unconstitutional
ones to stand.
Reasonable people may differ on how that balance should be
struck, There is, however, a bit more to be said, Even if courts are no
better at identifying fundamental rights or important interests, they
may be better at defending them against the temporary excesses of
popular sentiment that predictably overwhelm legislatures. Moreover, there may be other ways to identity circumstances in which the
legislative assessment of benefits and burdens is not to be trusted.
Thus, understanding due processjurisprudence as a means of enforcing the requirement that laws be in the public interest offers at least a
partial defense of current doctrine. What it does not explain is the
sharp bifurcation between "fundamental right..<;" and mere liberty interests. I will claim later that this dichotomy should be rejected.
\iVhat I have argued thus far is that the decision rules perspective
discloses a somewhat different story of substantive due process than
the standard narrative. It gives us an understanding of the Lochner
era as a relatively principled and good-faith attempt to implement a
plausible constitutional operative proposition, one that the Court
continues to invoke today.1f! It explains why that era's doctrine
proved unsustainable and it offers a partial defense of current substantive due process jurisprudence. The defense is only partial because the primary factor I have identified as supporting aggressive judicial review of legislation infringing on important interests does not
provide a full explanation: the high cost of error does not by itself
give a reason to allocate decisionmaking authority to courts rather
than legislatures. In the next Part, I will explain how the decision

III Invocation is not enforcement, of course, and it is commonplace that much special interest legislation survives rational basis review. Vlnat this means, however, is not that the Court has
decided that naked transfers are permissible, but that primary responsibility for enforcing this
requirement must lie with the legislature. That i~ why, in the cases upholding what seem to be
such transfers, the Court goes to such lengths to concoct fanciful explanations that are consistent with the public interest. See cases cited sujJT({ note 3.7.

FORGET THE FUf·/DAlVIFNTAL')·

Sept. 2006J

995

rules perspective suggests that substantive due process jurisprudence
might be improved.

III. A

BETTER FUTURE: THE STRANGE FATE OF FOOTNOTE FOUR

Lochner-era substantive due process, I have argued, can be understood as ajudicial attempt to restrict government to its proper sphere
and purposes. The attempt failed because the boundaries the judiciary sought to maintain-between private economic enterprises and
those affected with a public interest; between legislation serving the
public interest and impermissible attempts to redistribute-carne to
seem either incoherent or vvithin the legislative competence. Nondeferential decision rules thus came to seem an intolerable usurpation of legislative authority. Yet ,,,,hen the Court abjured the venture
in Camltme Products, it: promised to continue fairly aggressive supervision of governmental action in a certain class of cases: those set out
in footnote four, in which the government infringed on a textually
protected right, targeted a minority, or burdened a group whose interests the political process could not be trusted to protect.
Under ,,,,hat constitutional provision was footnote-four review intended to be performed? Camlene Products, of course, was a due process case. So, too, are most of the cases it: cites as examples or forerunners of footnote-four review-obviously, all of those applying Bill
of Rights provisions against the states,'!! but also those illustrating the
invalidation of state attempts to target religious and national minorities.!~ Targeting of racial minorities is illustrated in Camlene by two
equal protection cases dealing with voting righrs,l:\ but the support for
the general methodology is located in no particular provision at all.
Instead, at the end of the footnote, Stone cites McCulloch v. Mmylanr(1
45
and South Camhna Slate Highway DejJartment v. Bmnwell Bms.
These
cases are not so much doctrinal precursors as illustrations of the
method of analysis. Each features a situation in which legislatures

" Camlenl' ciled Stmm!J!'lf!: '!. California, 2:):1 l! .S. 359 (J 93 J) and i.ovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 44·j
(J938), two cases in \\'hich the Court applied the First .AJ11elH111lCllt to staLC action througll the
D11<" Process C1an."t'. Cltroll' 111', 304 U.S. at F,2 n.'1 .
.\C
For these categorics, c.'lnOll'lIl' cited a series of cases ilwalicLuing on dll<': process grounds
\;1\,', requiring pllblic schooling or resrricting lhe leaching or roreign languages or reqlliring
English-olliv instruction. Sf!' CIl1'O/r'FlI', ~()-I L].S.;\1 L'i~ 11.4 (citing, ill this order, PiclTe ,'. Soc'" of
Sisters. '2{j:) L.S. ~}IU (1()2~)) (striking down law rt'Cjlliring public schooling); \k\'u ". '\"br'lsb,
2(j2 L:.S. 300 (IY2~\) (striking rlm,'n 1;1\\' rCCjlliring English-on'" in.strunion); Banels v. Ie)\\'a , 2G2
U.S. '104 (J'j2~1) (same); Farrington ". ']'Okllshige, 2/:1 L.S. ·184 (1927) (striking clown law ]'('qui ri ng Eng! ish- or Ib\\'~l iian-onlv inst ruction) ).
"

SI'(' ('lImlt'lfI'.

;\;ixon '. Condon,
I-l

:)W) (·.S. ;\1 1:12-:1:-)
2:--\()

(·S. 7:' (I

11.-1

~n2))

17l:.S. (-l- \Yh(':-tl.i :~l(), 42~ (lHl~}).

" :'11:-) LX J77. 1:--\1 n.:2 (I(n~)

(ciring . 'ixon ". Ilnndon. '273 1.-;.S. 5~)G (1927). and
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Glllnot be trusted to balance costs and benefits accurately, because
the benefits go to those to whom the legislature is electorally accountable while the costs fall elsewhere, ,h
Carole-tiP Produrts is now cited ovenvhelming'lv as the source of the
equal protection suspect class doctrine, by courts and academics
aiike, I, But this \vas not always the case, The Supreme Court did not
cite Carolene in an equal protection case until 1971,'" and its early references came in due process cases.'" That footnote four methodology
was intended to he applied in due process cases makes perfect sense
when we consider the context. The perceived sin of Lo{hne;~style due
process, which Camlene renounced, was judicial second-guessing of
legislative assessments of the public interest, or balancing of costs and
benefits,-'!> Footnote four explains "vhen such legislative balancing is
not to be trusted; that is, it sets out conditions under which judicial
second-guessing-an anti-deferential decisi<:>l1 rule-is proper.
U

I

", The cited passage in :\!rCIIl!o{/t is a rf'jeetion of what might he called the political sateguards of nation;tlislll-iv!alyland's assertion that the power to la~ federal instrumentalities
might be left with the states in [he confidence tl1<ll it would not he abused, Marshall quite sensihlv responded that if l"laryLmd could dra\\' irs ta~ revenues from the federal government, it
would pLlitllv be tempted to o\"(:na~. ,"iN'i\1rClIfloch., 17 U.S, (4 V\"llGIL) at 428 (stating that the
federal go"ernment has no sareguards againsl an individual sl,lte's likely abuse of the power to
ta~). Barnwell 8ros. is a dOnll<lnr Commerce Clause case, likewise obser;ing rhat stale legislarures arc not to be trusted wht'n bem'fits ;u:crue within the state and custs fall Olltside it. Spp
{Jarnwpll fJro.l., ::IOC) U,S. at 184 n.~ (stating that stare regulalious I\'hiclt affect interstat.e commerce and benefit. in-state residents'll the expense of out-of:state residents are thought. LO be
ItllConstillltion,t!) ,
17 Sa, 1'.[;. Toll \"
Moreno,k)8 L.S. I, ~3 (1~l82) (Blackmtln, J., concurring) (describing
e(J.rolelll' Prodncts as "rhe mOIlH;nt the COllrt began construCling modern equal prolection doctrine"); RobertJ Cynkar, /)uJI//,illgo!l. Fl'rll'lali.\/lI, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1~61, 1~97 (2004) (describing CnrolplIl' Pmrlur/s foottlote four as "a stat.ement from the COllrt. of perhaps the single
most importanl clement of equal prolection doctrine"); Lawrence Schlam, 1~'lflla{jly ill l.ullure
aurl L/1u: All In/roduction {o lill' Origins and L'volnlioll ollhl' Lquaf {'m/a{ion Pri II ri!) II', 24 N. ILl_. U.
L. RE\', 425_ 4-10-41 (20(H) (describing C(J.ralme Products as ";\ seemingh' innocuous 'economic
due process' opinion, [that] would ultimateI:' (anri radically) re-strtleture equal prolection doctrine"), See [;l'IIeral/y Felix Gilman, The Frunolls Foolnule Four: A History oj /hl' Carolelle Products
Foolnole, 46 S. TE:\. 1.. REV, IfiC) (200-f) (discussing the hiswrical conte~t of f(.>ot!lote four and its
impact on courtS and academics).
4,< Sl'pGraham Y. Richardson, -to;) U.S, ;)G5, 372 (1971) (citing (;{(/{)lenl'f'mdur/swhile labeling
alieus as a class "a prime example (,f a 'discrete and insular' minority").
'" SI'f', e,/{-, Am, Fed'n of l.abor Y. Swing, 312 U.s. ;)21, ;)25 (EH]) (citing Camfnll' Prarlurls
footnote four for re\'icwing actions implicatiug the right to free speech with a ':jealous eye"), In
Skiunfrv. Okfa/toU/al'x reI Williallison, :~16 U.S. 535, :>44 (1942) (Stone, Cl-, concurring), Chief
Justice Stone cited his footnote while asserting that the case sholtld be decided on clue process,
and not. equal protection grounds. Stnne did not seem to be asserting a law-trulllping fundamental right IlOt to be sterilized; he endorsed the proposition that states rnay interfere wit.h an
individual's liberty to pre\"C'IH the "transmission or his socially injurious lendencies." fd, at 544
(citing Buck v, Bell, 274 U,S. 2(JO (1927)), Rather, he argued that when important interests are
at Slake, narrow tailoring, possibl:' by individualized hearings, is required. Id.
,',,, That was nOl what the I,oc/owr (:ourt saw ilself as doing, but I have argued that this perception became inescapable once the categorical questions the Coun saw itself as answering were
revealed as empirical quest.ions, or, worse, problems of balancing conflicting policy goals,
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Yet when a case presenting the opportunity to apply footnote four
review came, the Court blinked. Not in the sense that its nerve wavered, for it adopted an approach much harder to defend in order to
achieve the desired result, but in the sense that it lost sight of the
promise of Carolene. The case was Bolling v. SharjJe,"1 a challenge to
the .federal segregation of the District of CO,lumbia'\'pu~li~ ~cho~ls,
deCIded the same day as Brown v. Board oj Edllcatzon. - Chief JustlCe
Stone had been retired since 1946 (he
died that same veal')
.
. , and the
author of Bollingvvas ChiefJustice Earl 'f\Tarren.
"Varren's opinion in Bolling is strikingly devoid of analysis. It incorporates (or rather, reverse-incorporates) the Equal Protection
Clause into the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause \'vith the observation that, in viev,' of the decision in Brown, "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government. ,,',I Like Bolling's explanation of strict scrutiny,"1
this displays a remarkable insensitivity to history. The states, or some
of them, enslaved people and fought a \·var to defend their right to do
so. The national government fought a war to end slavery and forced
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments upon the defeateo
South, It is not at all unthinkable that the Reconstruction Congress
would believe the national government deserved greater trust and
Jess restraint than the states with respect to discrimination."" Nor, of
course, are racial classifications contrarv to our traditions-they, are
suspect precisely because invidious racial discrimination is such a
central feature of American history.
The argumentation in Bolling, then, is somewhat less than satisfactory. The fact has been widely noted. John Hart Ely called reverse
incorporation "gibberish both syntactically and historically,""l; an~
Lawrence Lessig complained of an "embarrassing textual gap.""
Richard Primus summarizes and glosses the objections: "The syntactical problem to \·vhich Ely refers is that if 'Due Process of Law' in/

'"

:-\'17U.S.4t l7(J954),

~.,! :.):17l....1.5. 483 (19:'i4).
,''; JjUl/ill!!.,

::H7 U,S. ,H :IOU.

',; It/. at 49~ ("Classifications based solely 1IpOil ran' III list be scrutini,'el! ,,'jlh p,lrriclILtr care,
since' Ihey arc cOnlrary 10 ollr tLlditiuns alld hent:(' constitlltionally suspccr.") .
.','. This is. hO\l'n't"r. not to say Ihal L!w h,:deral g()nTnnH~nl is ,dlo\\'t'd 10 engage in in\"idiulls
discrimination. At tht' k\"(,1 of C<lI1stillltionalh opel',ilil'l' proposilioll. Ihe Du<~ l'ruct'ss Clause
forbids il. <Ind in Ihat SC'II-;,' nulillig's slatement is CUITecl. The point is raliwl" tklt dc"cisioll rllles
might plallsibh' gralll nlon' dd,-rcllce to the federal go\'t"rnnlent lil,lIl th,-\" do iO the sLues,
sOlnclhing the CU1Irt lUI" ,lI 1t'<lSi .!u,tice SC;ili;\) lIsed to rn:ogni/e. \1'1' (:il" of Richmond " .l-A,
Croson Co" '1R8 L.S, .ji)<J. :)~~~~'\ (l~l~~J) (Scali,t, J. COllclllTing) (noiing hisloricd and strll,'
Illral ,lrgunwnts fi)r grt'alt'i" d,"r,.rellu' iO lilt' kdel'"d gO\"t'rnmelll).
'". El.\', 'Uli/O IlOI,- ii.;I1 :r2.
:.-, L,wrt'n<'C Lessig. (fllt/I'n/fllIt/lllg UWII,![l'tI Hmt/lll,!!;,': Fllil'lit\, 1I11t/ TlII'Il)', -17 SlY", L. Rt·.\'. :)~Fl.
4()~)
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eludes eqLlal protection, the Fourteenth Amendment's separate
guaran tees of due process and equal protection are reclllnc!cLnt. The
historical prohlem is that a text ratified in 17ql cannot 'incorporate'
a text written in 18b8."-'~
But mv aim is not to reiterate the received wisdom. To the contral-Y, my elaim is that Bolling is an easy case. A straightforward due
process application of footnote four tells us that this is a situation in
which the legislative balancing of costs and benefits cannot be
trusted-not only because the black residents of vVashinglOn, D.C.
were a politically weak minority subject to prejudice, but also because
they \vere completely unrepresented in Congress."q (Today, the official D.C. license plate reads "Taxation vVithout Representation.") If
segregated schooling burdens the interests of blacks, either through
stigma or inherent inequality, footnote four authorizes courts to rehll
vise the legislative judgment.
Ironically, then, in its haste to incorporate the Equal Protection
Clause proper into the Fifth Amendment, the Court discarded the
equality norm already present within due process jurisprudence-not
an anti-classification equality norm, but a norm of equal concern and
respect.';1 The due process demand that legislation promote the public interest can be cashed out in various ways, of which one is the deI

',.< Richard A. Primus, Bolling A. lo ne. 104 COl..l'\1. L.. Rn' Sir,. 977 11.7 (2004) (cit'ltions omitted). For a defense of Bolling as the lcgitim;lte protection of a duc process liben;' interest, sec
David E. Bernslein, Bolling, Due Process, Equal PlOlpclion. and [,ochncrjJ!wbia, 9~ CEO L. J 1253.
1261-74 (2005)

-", From a perspee:tiw, concerned only about representatiun in the political process, Bolling
is, in l~let, even easier than Bmwn.
", It is worth lllelltioning in passing, that, while I think fooulote four's due process analysis
was the best path in Bolling, the difficulties of reverse incnrpor,uion are exaggerated. Suppose,
as the critics do, that the Due Process Clause protects func!;ulIcntal rights. The obvious fundamental rights are those that are textually el1l1Il1er;ued-for II1stance. in thc Bill of Rights. The
Equal Prmection Clause is also textually enumerated, ho\\·-('\'<,I, so it is just as easy to apply it
against the kderal government as it is to apply the speech cLluse against the states. This <trgument also handles the ['edundancy objection-if due process includes equal protection because
it is a fundamental right, rather than because it is somchow inherent ill the conccpt of due
process, then t.he Equal Protection Clause is nCCeSS<lIy to make clear equality's fundamental
St'ltuS. As for history, there is no real reason to suppose that <tn earlier text cannot incorporate
a later one. If what the Due Process Clause does is protect fundalnental rights, it is perfectlv
reasonable to suppose that as righl> attain fundamelltal statlls through textual specification,
they comc within the scope of the clause. The couceptu,t1 problem here is that originalists and
non-originalists alike seem to suppose that fidclity to the original meaning of the Constitution
requires that cases be decided as they would have been at the time of the ratifIcation of the
relevant constitutional provision. This supposition is quite miswken. See K.ER1\lIT ROOSEVEl.T
III, TilE M\TH OF JL'DICIAL ACTIVISM: M.-\KI~C SEi\SE OF SL'PRl.\IE COURT DECISIO:--':S 47 (forthcoming 200G) (arguing against this version of originalism).
';1 The cause for the COllrt'S failure to rely more ckarlv on clue process proper appears to be
a desire' to avoid associat.ion ",ith the discredited I~odlller decision, a desire voiced strongly by

Justice Black. Sl'f Bernstein, sujJra note 57, at \276-79 (discussing \\'arren's original draft of the
Bolling opi nioll).
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mand that the government, in assessing costs and benefits, not weigh
some people's interests more heavily than others.
This demand has dropped out of the due process equation.
'When the clause came back to life with Griswold and its progeny, it
was focused on fundamental rights that trumped otherwise valid state
laws. \iVhy it took this form is a question with no clear answer. My
admittedly tentative guess is that it was related to the application of
Bill of Rights liberties against the states. "Incorporating" Bill of
Rights provisions into the Due Process Clause while following the
Lochner limited government model of due process would do very little, because Lochner jurisprudence did not understand due process
liberties as trumps. That sort of incorporation would thus have given
individuals a free speech right, for instance, that could be curtailed
by any valid exercise of the police pm-ver. (Indeed, this anemic First
Amendment is exactly what we see in the early incorporation cases,
such as Gitlow.';'2) Because this sort of incorporation would effectively
do nothing at all, and because Bill of Rights liberties are plausibly
understood as trumps, the Court may have been led to think of their
incorporated versions as trumps as well. And from that, it seems to
follow that the purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect such
"fundamental" rights-both those specified by constitutional text and
whatever other ones might be identified by some appropriate
rnethod.
I have argued already that this approach is mistaken in its understanding of the operative proposition underlying the Due Process
Clause, \-vhich is not about fundamental rights.';:;'- But the decision
rules it has led us to are not necessarily unjustified. There are, indeed, reasons for judges to defer less to legislative decisions to restrict
highly important liberties. \f\i11at I \",ant to suggest here is that focusing on the actual operative proposition and restoring footnote four

,;~ Cillo", \'. New York, 2G8 liS. 6,')2. 667 (J92:i) ("That a SLue in rhe exercise oj ilS poli,e
power Ill;'y punish those who abltst, rthe frC'ectom of speech] bv 1Iltnances inimical to lhe public welfare, tending 10 corrupl public morals, incite 10 crime. or disllIrb ,he public pe;tce, is not
open to tjllC'sLion,").
'd Bo/lillg, bv missing an opportunity to explain due process in lfTIlIS of footnote tOUL be;lr,
sOllle of lIlt' blame for [hi, mistake. :\1ore signiflcanr is probably I he decision in niP Slllllghll'lhUILSP Cuses, tt'\ U,S, (Ill \Yall,) ~f) (J87~>, which drove later COUlIS 10 purslw inrorporatitJn
rhrough the Due Process Clause by rejecting the idea [har Fourteenrh i\mendl1lenr "pri\'ilegt',
or immunities" indueit'd the Bill of Rights's guarantees. Set irl. ~\I 79 (construing federal pri\ijl>gCS ;llHI imllJunities ~lS pre-existing f(~cteral righrs against stalt's). /31/1.1'1'1' irl. at 118 (BradIeY.j.,
dissellring) (Iisring flill of Rights proyisions as pri\'ileges or il1lllJllllities of nali<lnal citiz.ellship).
Th;\I ,h" incorpor<ttio)! \l'I1lUre ('ollld more profitahly ha\'c been llllckrrakt'll llnder 11](' Pri\'ikgt"s or Illlllllllliti,'s Clause is probabh' \\·ell-l'1I011gh accepted 10 (Ollnr as (tJll\','luion:l! wisdtJlll
atlltJllg ];1\,' professors. -\khil Alllar gin's ;[ p<lrticularly lrenchant st<1r('\ncnt "f this argulllt'ur
S"" gl'lll'm/ly AI" j II. REFIl :\\1 \R, TH F lit l.l OF R ICHTS: CR EAT\():\ .-\:\ 11 Ru :() ,\;ST I< t :( 'Til l:\ (I '19S).
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to its pruper place couicl produce a rU]h~jllstitied due process juris-

pnletence. '"
The rlrSl. thing to do i:~ to stop fetishi/ing runclamentality. The
idea that judges can identify non-textual fundamental rights protected by the due process clause has been the main target of critics of
substantive clue process. This criticism has substantial merit. If due
process jurisprudence is conceptualized as enforcing constitutional
operative propositions related to the specific: fundamental rights that
the Court has identified, it does look remarkably free-wheeling and
antidemocratic.
It is not necessarily illegitimate in its entirety: the Ninth Arnendment suggests that such unenumerated rights exist, and given the
modern embrace of judicial supremacy, it might be supposed that
judges are the proper enforcers. One might also argue that these
rights are among the privileges and inullunities of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Battle lines tend to be clravvn over how such rights are
to be identified, and the struggle to confine or justify judicial creativIi
ity in this regard is the story of most of the rnodern cases. "
But the debate over whether a particular right is "fundamental" in
some uniquely constitutional sense is one that need not be engaged
in at all. If the Court is in fact identifying such rights, it is engaged at
best in an aggressive Ninth Amendment or Privileges and Immunities
Clause jurisprudence. The focus on funcLunentality is not a plausible
due process approach because the operative proposition behind the
Due Process Clause, as I have described it, is not about fundamental
rights at alL';'; Instead, it is about the government's duty to act in the
public interest-Lo promote the general welfare, either through laws
whose benefits are available to all, or at least through laws whose
benefits exceed their costs.';' The question for crafting due process

.;; TilliS, OIH: of Illy conclusions is thal lhose assnlinFi that HoI' should have rested on the
Equal Protection Clause are barking up the I\Tong lITt', The trnth is that dlle process should be
an equalily-uriented doctrine, as it used to be. The pr()hlt'lll with Hoe is not thal it was decided
under the wrong cbuse; it. is t.hat the right. clause hils been Illisunderstood.
h,', The central fault line here is the ;'ole of tr'lclit.ion and the degree of generality at which to
describe all asserted right. COllljJare Michael H. v. Gerald D" -l~Jl U.S. 110, 127 n.() (198~)) (arglling for specific clescription of rights), with Laurence I I. Tribe & Michael C. DOli', [,('1wL\ of Geuualit} in Ihe fJl'jinilion of Rights, '57 U. CHI. 1.. REV. J{F)! (I~Jl)O) (criticizingJustice Scalia's opinion
in Mit/ul!'l H.). Consen1at.ives appeared to have V'-Oll wilh Washinglon v. Glw;/{sung, 52] U.S. 702,
721 (] 997), in which the Court accepted the necessilv of "a 'careful description' of the asserted
fundalllem;t11iberty inleresL" Sel' Michael 'A'. McConllcll, Thf Night 10 Dil' and Ihl' juristJrudl'uu of
Traditio)/, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 605, 666 (suggesting that "ith (;Illcksue)g, "the Roe era callle to an
end."). I.awrn/l:p 1'. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) has confused the picture.
"" 5,1'1' sU!Jm leXl accompanying notes 3(,-38. [belin'e lhal a sensitive reading of the Lochlw'
era~ases beal's this out. See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying texl.
,,, ]n f'~let, even Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is probablY nOl llt'cessary. It is imaginable lhal in
some circumslances. a concern for equality could )uslif)' a legislative judgment thal non-COSl-
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decision rules is how to decide when the legislative assessment of
costs and benefits cannot be trusted. vVhen should courts decline to
defer?
Modern substantive due process, in giving strict scrutiny to laws
infringing "fundamental rights" could be understood as answering
this question: the legislature is not to be trusted to strike the right
balance when dealing with highly important interests. But by phrasing the matter in terms of fundamental rights that the Constitution
protects, it has muddled the issue and delegitimized the venture, for
it is perfectly clear that not all highly important interests are constitutionally shielded from legislative interference-at least, not by decision rules that give primary authority to judges. The modern Court,
just like the Lochner Court, appears to be substituting its judgment
about good policy for that of the legislature, andjust like the lochner
COllrt, it has been unable to explain why.'iK
That explanation is what footnote four gives. A better approach
to substantive due process would resemble the following. Ordinarily,
the legislature is trusted to balance costs and benefits in promoting
the public interest. In some cases, where highly important intere~ts
are at stake, somewhat less deferential judicial reviev,i is justified as a
second negative, allowing for the possibility that the legislature has
made a patently unreasonable decision imposing unacceptably high
costs. (To this extent, my reconstruction resembles the approach
endorsed by Justice Souter in \VnshhJll,-tOl1 v. Glucks1JeJg,"" and the sec-·
ond Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman '") ]n other circumst~mces, j1<1rticular bctors suggest that the legislative judgment is not to he
trusted, because the burden of the law falls on people wbose interests
the legislature might count less highly, There, judicial review need
not he particularly deferential; if the ordinary legislative competence

bCIH·fil~jllslifit'd redisLriblHion

could sen·e rill' public illttTcsl. BUL for thc pllJ'poses uf this '';(OClioll, I \l"ill assul11c a simple cost-bendit reqllirelll<"1l1.

,., A difkn'l1\ ,,·a)' of describing the problem is IILlI h;1\·illg c"ded the ddillilion of tIll' !mbii(
iJllCreSl lO the legislatllre, the COLIn had to filld SI!lllelhing lhat could ot'feal all "thcJ,,,'ist, \·alit!
Lt\\', C"lblillilionally-proleCled. rights are Ihe alls,,'er, But the demand Ihal llw illterests prolenni by Ihe Due Process Clanse be cOnStiilltiollally special brings lip the qUl:slioll of ho,,· In
idclllif\ such illll:rcsis-and pushes aside- thl' CjIWSliol1 ofwht'll the It'gislalllrt: can be trllSled.

".; "l:!] [·,S, ;1\ I(i~ (Solller, J., concurring) (l!t-S( Jibing sllbSt;uHivt' dlW process as ··a jlldici;ti
"blig;llioll 10 scrulini/,e an\" impingcl11clll Oil such all illlp"nalli inll'Tcsl \\ilh jwighlt"lw<l
carc· ... ): irl. ;ll/lieJ ('"[1')lw lJl\sillcSS of sncll rl'\il·" is 1101 Ihe illt-l1Iificati"n oj ,,'lrate>:llIal ;I!ls,,hll,'s bill S(Tlllill\· of a !"gis]aliH' res"!lItinll (perhaps llllconsciolls) ,,[" clashing pr;n .. ipit's, . , , I.J Judicial Il'\'il'lI· slili has 110 1I';lrr;1I11 I" slIhsrillll(· "n(' l-e;IS'lIlabl(' rl'S"IUlioll or ill<"
("1J1I1Clldillg jJ"SililJllS !()r ;ll1other. bill allllHlril\" to sllppl;lIl1 till' halann' ;t!n';H!\ stnlcK b("I'."'"("I~
Ille n>;I!,·IH!(OrS onh' lI'hen il LI!Is outside 11ll' rl';l!tll of Ihe rl';lSullaiJlc,·').

';" :)<1,; l·.S.~'l7. :i~':2 (!91.il) (lJarL1JI .J .. diSSt·11Iillg) ('"Tile bcsi Illal c;~n Iw s;lid i.s tlidl
Ihrollgll Ih,' COlliS<' oj" Ihis (;Ollrt·S decisions il has r('pn's"1It('(1 tilt" hlLIIHT \I'hich nl!:' '\,liin:J,
1>11111 upnll p"sllIlalt's ,,! ['(·,'I"'CI j""1 Illl' lilw1"l' oj" II\("' indi\'idll;l!, has SlrtleK iWI\"·"JI Illal lil>'·'I'
:Ind tilt" (kllLlllds o! olgalli/t·d ,,)ei('I\." )
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is suspect, judicial second-guessing of pOliCY choices (a nondeferential decision rule) is justified.'J [ll circumstances where both
b.ctors are present-a high-cost la\\I and a doubtfullcgislative competence-strict scrutiny (an anti-deferentia.! decision rule) would be
appropriate.7~
This approach requires judges to identity two things: high-cost
laws and circumstances where the legislative judgment is suspect.
Each, I think, can be done with more confidence than the identification of unenumerated fundamental rights, and \·vith less intrusion
into the legitimate sphere of legislative competence. The degree to
which an interest is important can be ascertained by defining it at a
level of generality adequate enough to attribute it to society at large,
or at least the politically dominant group, and then asking what justifications are deemed sufficient to restrict the interest. Thus, the interest in contraception can plausibly be analyzed as contraception.
Homosexual sodomy has to be expanded to sexual liberty, and abortion to bodily autonomy.7:~ If society generally seems to require highly
I

;1 Such an approach ,\·ould mark th~ relurn of footnote fOUf, and also, of course. sornething
akin to Ely's process theory. It has <lbo been recommended, in a version more closelv resembling this one, by Guido Calabresi and, more recently, Rebecca Brown. Spe gl'lumlly Rebecca
Brown, Lilwrly, Ih!! New Equality. 77 ~YL. L REV. 1491 (2002); Guido C<llabresi. Foreword: Anlidi5C11millalio'l/ anri CO'l/slillllionnl A{(,o'/llltabilil} (H'hallhe BOTk-Brennan [)pbalp (!!;1wres), 105 H,\R\'. L
Rt:v. 80 (1991).

'" This general approach to the creation of decision rules can be seen in a number of different doctrinal areas. In addition to the areas analyzed in Roosevelt, supra note 1, First .-\mendment jurisprudence call be understood as tailoring decision rules in a similar fashion, by allocating heightened scrutinv 011 the basis of bot.h high-cost laws and skepticism about legislative
good faith. St.rieter scrutillY for come nt-based restrictions on speech makes sense bot.h bec<luse
such restrictions are likely to have a higher than normal cost ill terms of skewing debate, and
because t.hey are the most obvious [orin t.hat governmental attempts to censor ideas would take.
Vg., Elena Kagan, Privflle Speech, Public Pwp05e: The Role of (;ovemmenlal A'lotive in FilSl A menriment
Doclrine, hC) U. OIL L REV. 413 (1996) (regarding the Court's review as one of scanning the
government's motive for illegitimacy).
Illterestingly, David Strauss has suggested that the Lochner Court migbt have succeeded ill
cre'lling a durable liberty of cOl1lractjurisprudence had it produced something like the complicated and context-sensitive First Amendment analysis, rather tban its bright-line categorizations.
See David A. Strauss, Why IVas Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L REV. 3n, 375 (2003) (suggesting
that t.he Lochner court would have drawn less criticism if it bad instead championed tbe freedom of contract in a "limited and qualified way").
", Increasing t.he level of generality until a majoritarian analog can be founcl might seem to
load the dice in favor of a claimed liberty, in somewhat tbe opposite of the way in wbich Scalia's
suggested specificity loads the dice against it. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 CS 110, 127 n.6
(1989) (criticizing Justice Brennan's approach to considering claimed liberties from a high
level of generality). In fact, this is not the case. Articulating a claimed liberty at the highe~t
level of generality will indeed produce the conclusion that society recognizes such a liberty, bur
it will also tend to produce the conclusion that the liberty can be restrained for relatively insignificant reasons. A'i Justice Holmes observed in Lochner, "[t] he liberty of the citizen ... is interfered with by scbool laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes
his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or nOL" Lochner \'. l\:ew York,
198 U.s. 4::', 7::. (905) (Holmes,]., dis~enling).
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significant justifications to burden a particular interest, that IS good
evidence that such laws should be considered high cost.
The factors suggesting that legislative balancing may be doubted
have already been mentioned and need not be repeated at length.
Briefly, if the law's burdens fall on a group to which the legislature
can be expected to be less than responsive, there is reason to suppose
that it will discoun t those interest". Iden tifying such cases is something that courts can do; it is exactly what they used to do in deciding
whether a particular group should be considered a "suspect class" for
equal protection analysis. ,I Faced with such circumstances, courts
should examine the justifications deemed sufficient to burden an interest asserted by the majority, in order to determine whether lesser
justifications have been accepted ~~ adequate to burden a weaker
group's enjoyment of that interest." This, again, is not only something that court<.; can do but something that the Supreme Court actually does. In Free Exercise cases, it regularly looks at the value that
the state asserts as a justification for a law burdening religious exercise, and then at how the state treats that value in other contexts. For
example, the Coun considers what nonreligious interests the state restricts in the name of the asserted value, and what exceptions it will
allow. That is, it looks at how the state strikes the balance in other
contexts as a means of d~Lermining whether it has granted enough
weight to religious liberty.'''
This approach would replicate much, though perhaps not all, of
the modern Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. The OUIcomes of particular cases may be debatable, and they should not be a
litmus test in any evenL" The superiority of this approach is that it

01 Sri' Cil\" of Clt-I)Jillw Y. Cleburne Liyillg CtL, -17:\ (:.S. -U:Z (1()8:i) (ellullci;llillg crilnid fill'
"SUSjWCI cLiss" slalus): Frolltieru \'. Richardsoll, -til L.S. 677 (I~JT\) (s~l1lle).

c', This is l'"S<"Jlli~dh till' methodology suggested 1)\ CdblJrcsi as d llJ('allS uf J'<'\it'\\'illg lq.;i,Ltti\'(' cost-lJt'lwtlt allah-sis, SI'/' Calabresi, sllj)/IInOl(~ 10.

;" III <:IlImh ujlhl' I.llkllllli 8"ba!l1 :\yl' ,'. Ci/) ofliif/lNIh. :iO;.) t'.S. :l20 (J'l9;)).,lllsticc I-\.l'III1,·(h
nowcl thai tllt' cil\' or Hiakah's prollibition un the killing of ~llIil1LtlS allo\\'ed n:ceptioll' fOI kosher b\1lchning. hlllliing, ;1IJ(1 orher ;ICli\ities. sllggl"sling that il \\'as wt'ighil1g th,,' S;lIl1ni;\1I<
e"ercise of religiolls libert\' Jess lwa\ih' than other lelatin'h' \\l"aK illinests. Other Iree e:>:elci,,,·'
cases ;Ire sinlilar: illdenl. the practice of' teslillg Ill<' kgilillli'IC\' or tIlt' refllsal to gLlllt :I n·ligiol'"
C"plllplion h\' cOl1sideril1g ",hal 011]('1' n:t'llljJtion,s ;In' ;i1lo\\'ed is sl:lIHiard. As llH"nliolll'd. Ihi, is
('ss(>lllialh th,~ I1ll'·tl1<Jclo\ogy Sltggt's\l'd Il" C;I];lbrl'si :IS ;l 1I1L'~lIlS of' rc\ie\\'illg \q~i,sL\1i\(' coSIbendlt anah·sis.
" II d(ll's Iwar llJellti(Jl1. thollgh. ilL11 Ihis ;Ippro~\ch \\'oll!d gin: hciglHt'l1ed scnain\' In Ia\"
h<l\'ing ;1 di"jJ~lr;J1e imjJ:ln on Jlolilic;tlh' \\"';lK grollps. "ol1wlhillg cllrrenth' ;\chi,-\l'cl IIllder Ilt>jtlJ<'1 dill' pnl('<',s, Ill))' l'qll~i1 protectiol1. I beli('\'(' Ihis \\'llJild Iw a ,ignificll1l illlpron·lIwlll. II
llIighl ;d", '·':>:jHlH.1 ClllJgn"ssilJl1iil pll'''''!' 11IHI('r Sectiol1 11\(· of the FOlll'it'('lllh ..\IlIL'l1dlllCI1I.
IhuIlgl1 sillllJh' IllIdersl;Jlldillg tlw dislillClioll IWI\\',.,.ll deci,ion nil,'s :llld o!)('r;liin' proposilions
\\'(Juld do So:lS \\'ell. SI'I,RI)()S,'\·ell. \1I/JlII IIOll" I. ;(1 Ilil>:--;. . \lslJ. it migllt ,'llgg,·,1 Ihat (;ml""11 ".
(:Ii/lli/ll. 1'111 l :,S, :{S(i (I~JK~jl. i, \\TlJ 11 g:
due PHll('S' alJ:i1\'si, sllllJild 1)(:' ;I\'aibhk rq';ilrdk" 01
\\'lll'ill<'r ~llll'lh"1 COlblilllli()lLtljllO\'j,ioll "}lp";lrs III St'l <HI{ 1'<·1"\';1111 S!:llld;lnk
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does two things that modern substantive due process notably does
not. It identifies a constitutional operative proposition that the Court
can legitimatelv claim to be enforcing. and it gives reasons why the
Court might he justified in not deferring to a legislative determination that a law complies yvith the operative proposition. It is all illustration, in short, of how anention to operative propositions and the
Ltetors supporting the creation of non- or anti-deferential decision
rules can rationalize tangled areas of la\-\'.
CONCLUSION

The perceived illegitimacy in substantive due process jurisprudence stems in large part from the fact that the Court has attempted
to justify its decision rules as constitutional operative propositions: It
has characterized modern substantive due process decisions as protecting certain interests because they are constitutionally special
"fundamental rights." It is this characterization that gives force to the
crude ol~jection that the Constitution says nothing about privacy or
abonion, as well as the more sophisticated objection that the Court
h"ts failed to articulate a plausible method for identifying such rights,
much less a method within judicial, rather than legislative, competence. Both ol~jections can be avoided hy shifting the focus of clue
process jurisprudence away from fundamental rights and back to the
public interest. The best future for unenumeratecl rights, as far as
the Due Process Clause is concerned, is one in which we stop thinking abollt them as rights.

